### Politics

#### Yes vote switching—even due to unrelated legislation

**Simes and Saunders 2010** – \*publisher of the National Interest, \*\*Executive Director of The Nixon Center and Associate Publisher of The National Interest, served in the State Department from 2003 to 2005 (12/23, Dimitri and Paul, National Interest, “START of a Pyrrhic Victory?”, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/start-pyrrhic-victory-4626, WEA)

Had the lame-duck session not already been so contentious, this need not have been a particular problem. Several Senate Republicans indicated openness to supporting the treaty earlier in the session, including Senator Lindsey Graham and Senator John McCain. Senator Jon Kyl—seen by many as leading Republican opposition to the agreement—was actually quite careful to avoid saying that he opposed New START until almost immediately prior to the vote. Our own conversations with Republican Senate sources during the lame duck session suggested that several additional Republicans could have voted to ratify New START under other circumstances; Senator Lamar Alexander is quoted in the press as saying that **Republican anger over unrelated legislation cost** five to ten **votes**. By the time the Senate reached New START, earlier conduct by Senate Democrats and the White House had alienated many Republicans who could have voted for the treaty.

That the administration secured thirteen Republican votes (including some from retiring Senators) for the treaty now—and had many more potentially within its grasp—makes clear what many had believed all along: it would not have been so difficult for President Obama to win the fourteen Republican votes needed for ratification in the new Senate, if he had been prepared to wait and to work more cooperatively with Senate Republicans. Senator Kerry’s comment that “70 votes is yesterday’s 95” ignores the reality that he and the White House could have secured many more than 70 votes had they handled the process differently and attempts to shift the blame for the low vote count onto Republicans.

### Enviro Leadership

#### Can’t solve environmental leadership – past alt causes

**Victor 8** - law professor at Stanford's Program on Energy and Sustainable Development and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

(David G., "The next U.S. President won't be green", 5-1-08 <http://www.newsweek.com/id/135073/>)

The U.S. record on international environmental issues is highly uneven for reasons that have little to do with George W. Bush's leadership. His administration has been tarred across the planet for reckless leadership on international environmental issues. (Its actual record, while dreadful, is not a uniform failure. It has done useful things in a few areas, such as a thoughtful initiative to help conserve forests in the Congo Basin.) But the signature of Bush's reckless foreign policy in this area, his decision to withdraw from the Kyoto treaty barely three months after taking office, actually has its roots in the Clinton administration. Clinton was highly committed to environmental issues and his vice president, Al Gore, was an even more passionate leader. Their zealous diplomats negotiated a treaty that was larded with commitments that the United States never could have honored. The promise to cut U.S. emissions 7 percent below 1990 levels is a good example. Because actual emissions were rising steadily, it would have been impractical to turn them around in time to meet the 2012 Kyoto deadline. The U.S. Congress never could have passed the requisite legislation, and no leader in the White House could have changed that voting arithmetic. The U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was inevitable.

What does this mean for America's credibility in the world? When the American president promises, should anyone listen?

Increasingly, other countries are learning that the answer is no—because American leaders have a habit of promising a lot more than they can deliver. Environmental issues are particularly prone to overpromising, and not just by the United States. Europe, too, is fresh with unrealistic claims by political leaders. The European Union, for example, has launched negotiations for the post-Kyoto agreement by claiming that Europeans will cut greenhouse-gas emissions 20 percent to 30 percent by 2020—an outrageous goal considering that most of Europe (with the exception mainly of Britain and Germany) will fail to meet their existing targets, and emissions are actually rising. Europe as a whole would blow through its Kyoto targets if not for its generous use of a scheme that lets them take credit for overseas investment in low-carbon technologies—despite mounting evidence that many of those overseas credits don't actually deliver real reductions in emissions. Smart politicians know that the benefits lie mainly in the promising today and not in the delivery long in the future.

Ironically, the more enthusiastic the leader, the less credibility he or she has. While the Clinton administration was busy negotiating the Kyoto treaty, the U.S. Senate was passing a resolution, 95 to 0, to signal that it would reject any treaty that didn't contain specific commitments by developing countries to control their effluent of greenhouse gases. Since the developing countries had already rejected that outcome the Clinton administration had little room to maneuver. The great reversal in U.S. "leadership" on global warming over the last year—signaled by President Bush's speech three weeks ago embracing the need for limits on greenhouse gases—came from the people rather than top leaders. Public concern about global warming is rising (though it will be checked by the even more acute worries on the economy and war). The Bush speech was more a recognition that serious efforts to develop climate legislation are already well underway without his stamp. Many states are already planning to regulate greenhouse gases. The Senate has a serious bill on this subject scheduled for floor debate starting June 2. Its sponsors are Joe Lieberman (the former running mate of Al Gore but now alienated from the Democratic Party for his overly independent views) and John Warner (a Republican who has no former track record on global warming). These are ideal leaders for this issue because often it takes the fresh faces focused on building bipartisan majorities to get things done in America.

Perhaps the most interesting signal that American presidents are losing the ability to lead is an effort to rewrite the rules that would govern environmental treaties under American law. Committed environmentalists have rightly noted that America's Constitution requires a two-thirds vote for treaties in the Senate. That standard is nearly impossible to meet because one third of the Senate is usually opposed to anything interesting. Serious efforts are now underway to reinterpret environmental "treaties" as agreements between Congress and the president, which would require only a majority vote. Most trade agreements, for example, travel under this more lax standard and also have special voting rules that require Congress to approve the agreement as a whole package rather than pick it apart piece by piece. Rebranding and changing voting rules makes it easier to approve agreements, boosting the credibility of the president to negotiate agreements that serve the country's interest.

#### And, economic factors block

Christian Science Monitor 2007 [Warming's bad guys made good, lexis]

Leaders of the world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases, the United States and China, laid out plans in the past week to reduce their impact on the planet. But these two giants on the global scene also suggested two won'ts: They won't be bound to action by other nations and they won't hurt their own economies.

Even with those caveats, the fact that the Bush administration and China's top governing body, the State Council, acted just before the G-8 summit of industrial leaders this week is a healthy sign.

They now recognize their interests, and perhaps the welfare of all nations - especially poor ones - are at stake. They should be welcomed for joining the effort to save the global "commons" that is the atmosphere and oceans.

### 2NC Overview

#### Turns their PEMEX advantage – neoliberalism instills short-term oil volatility that makes production impossible

Oliveros 12 (Benjie, managing editor of Bulatlat, a socialist/alternative online news site, “The invisible hand of monopolies”, <http://bulatlat.com/main/2012/02/27/the-invisible-hand-of-monopolies/>)

Pump prices of gasoline in the US has increased by 30 percent in the last two months to reach $3.52 a gallon. (This amounts to P150.51 a gallon or P37.63 a liter, much lower than Philippine oil prices.) US consumers fear that it would reach $4 a gallon. (P171 a gallon or P42.76 a liter) And yet, demand for oil in the US is at a 15-year low. Because of low demand, oil companies have been shutting down large refineries in the US. According to a report written by Matthew Philips “Angry About High Prices, Blame Shuttered Oil Refineries,” which was published by Bloomberg Businessweek, since December, the US has lost from four to five percent of its refining capacity. However, this hardly affected the supply of oil because, according to a report “Spiking Gas Prices: GOP Sides with Big Oil Again” published by www.opposingviews.com, the number of oil drilling rigs in the US quadrupled during the last three years. The number of its working oil and gas drilling rigs topped that of the world combined. So demand for oil is low and the supply has considerably increased. The blame could not rest on increasing production costs either. In fact, according to the same report, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP, Chevron and Shell racked up a combined profit of $137 billion in 2011 even if they produced four percent less oil. Thus, if the demand for oil in the US is low but supply is increasing, who or what is to blame for the spike in oil prices? I could think of two reasons. First, oil, aside from gold, is the current commodity of choice for speculators. In a May 2008 article published on the website “Geopolitics – Geoeconomics,” by F William Engdahl, he said, “As much as 60% of today’s crude oil price is pure speculation driven by large trader banks and hedge funds.” He cited a June 2006 report of the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations entitled “The Role of Market Speculation in rising oil and gas prices,” which revealed that “…there is substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the large amount of speculation in the current market has significantly increased prices.” The same US Senate report also discovered that a lot of companies trading in the oil futures market are not actually producers or users of oil. Who are these speculators? The same article identified Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, as the two leading energy trading firms, as well as Citigroup and JP Morgan Chase. Speculators have been taking advantage of tensions in Syria and Iran by frantically trading in the oil futures market – the New York Mercantile Exchange for light, sweet crude and the ICE futures for Brent crude, as well as the Dubai Mercantile Exchange – thereby pushing spot prices up. This has also been the case in 2008 when speculators took advantage of the unrest in the Middle East, Sudan, Venezuela and Pakistan even if no supply shocks actually happened. Second, what we are experiencing is the invisible hand of the oil monopolies – the biggest of which are Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch Shell, and BP, with Chevron Texaco on fourth – that control the supply and dictate the prices of oil, and are the biggest winners in the spikes in oil prices. What is true in oil likewise applies in other commodities. Speculation and the invisible hand of monopolies play a major role in determining prices. Adam Smith must be turning in his grave. But mainstream economists and governments still refuse to look beyond their archaic, albeit rehashed, theories, which they label as new.

#### Turns Latin American and Mexican instability – keeps third world beholden to market practices Economic exploitation is the root cause of war.

William Eckhardt, Lentz Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, Journal of Peace Research, February 1990, p. 15-16

Modern Western Civilization used war as well as peace to gain the whole world as a domain to benefit itself at the expense of others: The expansion of the culture and institutions of modern civilization from its centers in Europe was made possible by imperialistic war… It is true missionaries and traders had their share in the work of expanding world civilization, but always with the support, immediate or in the background, of armies and navies (pp. 251-252). The importance of dominance as a primary motive in civilized war in general was also emphasized for modern war in particular: ‘[Dominance] is probably the most important single element in the causation of major modern wars’ (p. 85). European empires were thrown up all over the world in this process of benefiting some at the expense of others, which was characterized by armed violence contributing to structural violence: ‘World-empire is built by conquest and maintained by force… Empires are primarily organizations of violence’ (pp. 965, 969). ‘The struggle for empire has greatly increased the disparity between states with respect to the political control of resources, since there can never be enough imperial territory to provide for all’ (p. 1190). This ‘disparity between states’, not to mention the disparity within states, both of which take the form of racial differences in life expectancies, has killed **15-20 times as many people** in the 20th century as have wars and revolutions (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c). When this structural violence of ‘disparity between states’ created by civilization is taken into account, then the violent nature of civilization becomes much more apparent. Wright concluded that ‘Probably at least 10 per cent of deaths in modern civilization can be attributed directly or indirectly to war… The trend of war has been toward greater cost, both absolutely and relative to population… The proportion of the population dying as a direct consequence of battle has tended to increase’ (pp. 246, 247). So far as structural violence has constituted about one-third of all deaths in the 20th century (Eckhardt & Kohler, 1980; Eckhardt, 1983c), and so far as structural violence was a function of armed violence, past and present, then Wright’s estimate was very conservative indeed. Assuming that war is some function of civilization, then civilization is responsible for one-third of 20th century deaths. This is surely self-destruction carried to a high level of efficiency. The structural situation has been improving throughout the 20th century, however, so that structural violence caused ‘only’ 20% of all deaths in 1980 (Eckhardt, 1983c). There is obviously room for more improvement. To be sure, armed violence in the form of revolution has been directed toward the reduction of structural violence, even as armed violence in the form of imperialism has been directed toward its maintenance. But imperial violence came first, in the sense of creating structural violence, before revolutionary violence emerged to reduce it. It is in this sense that structural violence was basically, fundamentally, and primarily a function of armed violence in its imperial form. The atomic age has ushered in the possibility, and some would say the probability, of killing not only some of us for the benefit of others, nor even of killing all of us to no one’s benefit, but of putting **an end to life itself!** This is surely carrying self-destruction to some infinite power beyond all human comprehension. It’s too much, or superfluous, as the Existentialists might say. Why we should care is a mystery. But, if we do, then the need for civilized peoples to respond to the ethical challenge is very urgent indeed. **Life itself may depend upon our choice.**

### Framework

#### Turns case and shuts down deliberation—implementation focus is reductionist and displaces agency—our argument is that the framework for analysis is itself a political choice

**Adaman and Madra** **2012** – \*economic professor at Bogazici University in Istanbul, \*\*PhD from UMass-Amherst, economics professor (Fikret and Yahya, Bogazici University, “Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology”, http://www.econ.boun.edu.tr/content/wp/EC2012\_04.pdf, WEA)

States as agents of economization

Neoliberal reason is therefore not simply about market expansion and the withdrawal of the ¶ welfare state, but more broadly about reconfiguring the state and its functions so that the state ¶ governs its subjects through a filter of economic incentives rather than direct coercion. In ¶ other words, supposed subjects of the neoliberal state are not citizen-subjects with political and ¶ social rights, but rather economic subjects who are supposed to comprehend (hence, ¶ calculative) and respond predictably (hence, calculable) to economic incentives (and ¶ disincentives). There are mainly two ways in which states under the sway of neoliberal reason ¶ aim to manipulate the conduct of their subjects. The first is through markets, or market-like ¶ incentive-compatible institutional mechanisms that economic experts design based on the ¶ behaviorist assumption that economic agents respond predictably to economic (but not ¶ necessarily pecuniary) incentives, to achieve certain discrete objectives. The second involves a ¶ revision of the way the bureaucracy functions. Here, the neoliberal reason functions as an ¶ internal critique of the way bureaucratic dispositifs organize themselves: The typical modus¶ operandi of this critique is to submit the bureaucracy to efficiency audits and subsequently ¶ advocate the subcontracting of various functions of the state to the private sector either by fullblown privatization or by public-private partnerships.

While in the first case citizen-subjects are treated solely as economic beings, in the second case ¶ the state is conceived as an enterprise, i.e., a production unit, an economic agency whose ¶ functions are persistently submitted to various forms of economic auditing, thereby suppressing ¶ all other (social, political, ecological) priorities through a permanent economic criticism. ¶ Subcontracting, public-private partnerships, and privatization are all different mechanisms ¶ through which contemporary governments embrace the discourses and practices of ¶ contemporary multinational corporations. In either case, however, economic **policy decisions** ¶ (whether they involve macroeconomic or microeconomic matters) **are isolated** from public ¶ debate and deliberation, and **treated as matters of** technocratic design and **implementation**, ¶ while regulation, to the extent it is warranted, is mostly conducted by experts outside political ¶ life—the so-called independent regulatory agencies. **In the process, democratic participation** in ¶ decision-making **is either limited to an already** highly-**commodified**, spectacularized, mediatized ¶ electoral **politics**, or to the calculus of opinion polls where consumer discontent can be ¶ managed through public relations experts. As a result, a **highly reductionist notion** of economic ¶ efficiency ends up being the only criteria with which to measure the success or failure of such ¶ decisions. Meanwhile, individuals with financial means are free to provide support to those in ¶ need through charity organizations or corporations via their social responsibility channels.

Here, two related caveats should be noted to sharpen the central thrust of the argument¶ proposed in this chapter. First, the separation of the economic sphere from the social-ecological whole is not an ontological given, but rather a political project. **By** treating social¶ subjectivity solely in economic terms and deliberately **trying to insulate policy-making from** ¶ popular **politics** and democratic participation, the neoliberal project of economization makes a ¶ political choice. Since there are no economic decisions without a multitude of complex and ¶ over-determined social consequences, the attempt to block (through economization) all ¶ political modes of dissent, objection and negotiation available (e.g., “voice”) to those who are ¶ affected from the said economic decisions is itself a political choice. In short, economization is ¶ itself a political project.

Yet, this drive towards technocratization and economization—which constitutes the second ¶ caveat—does not mean that the dirty and messy distortions of politics are gradually being ¶ removed from policy-making. On the contrary, to the extent that policy making is being ¶ insulated from popular and democratic control, it becomes **exposed to the “distortions” of** a ¶ politics of **rent-seeking and speculation**—ironically, as predicted by the representatives of the ¶ Virginia School. Most public-private partnerships are hammered behind closed doors of a ¶ bureaucracy where states and multinational corporations divide the economic rent among ¶ themselves. The growing concentration of capital at the global scale gives various industries ¶ (armament, chemical, health care, petroleum, etc.—see, e.g., Klein, 2008) enormous amount ¶ of leverage over the governments (especially the developing ones). It is extremely important, ¶ however, to note that this tendency toward rent-seeking is not a perversion of the neoliberal ¶ reason. For much of neoliberal theory (in particular, for the Austrian and the Chicago schools), ¶ private monopolies and other forms of concentration of capital are preferred to government ¶ control and ownership. And furthermore, for some (such as the Virginia and the Chicago ¶ schools), rent-seeking is a natural implication of the “opportunism” of human beings, even ¶ though neoliberal thinkers disagree whether rent-seeking is essentially economically efficient (as ¶ in “capture” theories of the Chicago school imply) or inefficient (as in rent-seeking theories of ¶ the Virginia school imply) (Madra and Adaman, 2010).

This reconfiguration of the way modern states in advanced capitalist social formations govern ¶ the social manifests itself in all domains of public and social policy-making. From education to ¶ health, and employment to insurance, there is an observable **shift from** rights-based policymaking forged through public **deliberation and participation, to policy-making based solely on** ¶ economic viability where policy issues are treated as matters of **technocratic calculation**. In this ¶ regard, as noted above, the **treatment of subjectivity** solely in behaviorist terms of economic ¶ incentives **functions as the key conceptual choice** that makes the technocratization of public ¶ policy possible. Neoliberal thinking and practices certainly have a significant impact on the ¶ ecology. The next section will focus on the different means through which various forms of ¶ neoliberal governmentality propose and actualize the economization of the ecology.

#### Use the ballot to reclaim social pedagogy—skills and knowledge are force multipliers for inequality unless we prioritize resistance in education—it’s your academic responsibility

**Giroux, cultural studies prof, 5**—Global Television Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, selected as the Barstow Visiting Scholar for 2003 at Saginaw Valley State University, named as Distinguished Scholar at multiple institutions, Ph.D. (Henry, Fast Capitalism, 1.2 2005, “Cultural Studies in Dark Times: Public Pedagogy and the Challenge of Neoliberalism,” RBatra)

In opposition to these positions, I want to reclaim a tradition in radical educational theory and cultural studies in which pedagogy as a critical practice is central to any viable notion of agency, inclusive democracy, and a broader global public sphere. Pedagogy as both a language of critique and possibility looms large in these critical traditions, not as a technique or a priori set of methods, but as a political and moral practice. As a political practice, pedagogy is viewed as the outgrowth of struggles and illuminates the relationships among power, knowledge, and ideology, while self-consciously, if not self-critically, recognizing the role it plays as a deliberate attempt to influence how and what knowledge and identities are produced within particular sets of social relations. As a moral practice, pedagogy recognizes that what cultural workers, artists, activists, media workers, and others teach cannot be abstracted from what it means to invest in public life, presuppose some notion of the future, or locate oneself in a public discourse. The moral implications of pedagogy also suggest that **our responsibility as intellectuals** for the public cannot be separated from the consequences of the knowledge we produce, the social relations we legitimate, and the ideologies and identities we offer up to students as well as colleagues.¶ **Refusing to decouple politics from pedagogy** means, in part, creating those public spaces for engaging students in robust dialogue, challenging them to think critically about received knowledge and energizing them to recognize their own power as individual and social agents. Pedagogy has a relationship to social change in that it should not only help students frame their sense of understanding, imagination, and knowledge within a wider sense of history, politics, and democracy but should also enable them to recognize that they can do something to alleviate human suffering, as the late Susan Sontag (2003) has suggested. Part of this task necessitates that cultural studies theorists and educators anchor their own work, however diverse, in a radical project that seriously engages the promise of an unrealized democracy against its really existing and greviously incomplete forms. Of crucial importance to such a project is rejecting the assumption that theorists can understand social problems without contesting their appearance in public life. More specifically, any viable cultural politics needs a socially committed notion of injustice if we are to take seriously what it means to fight for the idea of the good society. Zygmunt Bauman (2002) is right in arguing that "if there is no room for the idea of wrong society, there is hardly much chance for the idea of good society to be born, let alone make waves" (p. 170).¶ Cultural studies' theorists need to be more forceful, if not more committed, to linking their overall politics to modes of critique and collective action that address the presupposition that democratic societies are never too just, which means that a democratic society must constantly nurture the possibilities for self-critique, collective agency, and forms of citizenship in which people play a fundamental role in shaping the material relations of power and ideological forces that affect their everyday lives.

### Perm

#### The perm fails—ad hoc reconfiguration of your relation to neolib undermines critical thinking—the alt alone is the only conceptually coherent approach—this also proves they cede the political through expertism and the logic of fungibility and competition

**Glover et al 2006** – \*Policy Fellow at the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy, University of Delaware, \*\*Directs the Urban Studies and Wheaton in Chicago programs, selected to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs Emerging Leaders Program for 2011-2013, \*\*\*2007 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Distinguished Professor of Energy & Climate Policy at the University of Delaware, Head of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy (Leigh Glover, Noah Toly, John Byrne, “Energy as a Social Project: Recovering a Discourse”, in “Transforming Power: Energy, Environment, and Society in Conflict”, p. 1-32, http://www.ceep.udel.edu/energy/publications/2006\_es\_energy\_as\_a\_social\_project.pdf, WEA)

When measured in social and political-economic terms, the current energy¶ discourse appears impoverished. Many of its leading voices proclaim great¶ things will issue from the adoption of their strategies (conventional or sustainable), yet inquiry into the social and political-economic interests that¶ power promises of greatness by either camp is mostly absent. In reply, some¶ participants may petition for a progressive middle ground, acknowledging¶ that energy regimes are only part of larger institutional formations that organize political and economic power. It is true that the political economy of¶ energy is only a component of systemic power in the modern order, but it¶ hardly follows that pragmatism toward energy policy and politics is the reasonable social response. Advocates of energy strategies associate their contributions with distinct pathways of social development and define the choice¶ of energy strategy as central to the types of future(s) that can unfold. Therefore, acceptance of appeals for pragmatist assessments of energy proposals,¶ that hardly envision incremental consequences, would indulge a form of self-deception rather than represent a serious discursive position.¶ An extensive social analysis of energy regimes of the type that Mumford¶ (1934; 1966; 1970), Nye (1999), and others have envisioned is overdue. The¶ preceding examinations of the two strategies potentiate conclusions about¶ both the governance ideology and the political economy of modernist energy transitions that, by design, leave modernism undisturbed (except, perhaps, for its environmental performance).¶ The Technique of Modern Energy Governance¶ While moderns usually declare strong preferences for democratic governance, their preoccupation with technique and efficiency may preclude the¶ achievement of such ambitions, or require changes in the meaning of democracy that are so extensive as to raise doubts about its coherence. A veneration¶ of technical monuments typifies both conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies and reflects a shared belief in technological advance as commensurate with, and even a cause of, contemporary social progress. The modern¶ proclivity to search for human destiny in the march of scientific discovery¶ has led some to warn of a technological politics (Ellul, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c;¶ Winner, 1977, 1986) in which social values are sublimated by the objective¶ norms of technical success (e.g., the celebration of efficiency in all things). In¶ this politics, technology and its use become the end of society and members¶ have the responsibility, as rational beings, to learn from the technical milieu¶ what should be valorized. An encroaching autonomy of technique (Ellul,¶ 1964: 133 – 146) replaces critical thinking about modern life with an awed¶ sense and acceptance of its inevitable reality.¶ From dreams of endless energy provided by Green Fossil Fuels and Giant¶ Power, to the utopian promises of Big Wind and Small-Is-Beautiful Solar,¶ technical excellence powers modernist energy transitions. Refinement of technical accomplishments and/or technological revolutions are conceived to¶ drive social transformation, despite the unending inequality that has accompanied two centuries of modern energy’s social project. As one observer has¶ noted (Roszak, 1972: 479), the “great paradox of the technological mystique¶ [is] its remarkable ability to grow strong by chronic failure. While the treachery of our technology may provide many occasions for disenchantment, the¶ sum total of failures has the effect of increasing dependence on technical¶ expertise.” Even the vanguard of a sustainable energy transition seems swayed¶ by the magnetism of technical acumen, leading to the result that enthusiast¶ and critic alike embrace a strain of technological politics.¶ Necessarily, the elevation of technique in both strategies to authoritative¶ status vests political power in experts most familiar with energy technologies¶ and systems. Such a governance structure derives from the democratic-authoritarian bargain described by Mumford (1964). Governance “by the people”¶ consists of authorizing qualified experts to assist political leaders in finding¶ the efficient, modern solution. In the narratives of both conventional and¶ sustainable energy, citizens are empowered to consume the products of the¶ energy regime while largely divesting themselves of authority to govern its¶ operations.¶ Indeed, systems of the sort envisioned by advocates of conventional and¶ sustainable strategies are not governable in a democratic manner. Mumford¶ suggests (1964: 1) that the classical idea of democracy includes “a group of¶ related ideas and practices... [including] communal self-government... unimpeded access to the common store of knowledge, protection against arbitrary external controls, and a sense of moral responsibility for behavior that¶ affects the whole community.” Modern conventional and sustainable energy¶ strategies invest in external controls, authorize abstract, depersonalized interactions of suppliers and demanders, and celebrate economic growth and¶ technical excellence without end. Their social consequences are relegated in¶ both paradigms to the status of problems-to-be-solved, rather than being¶ recognized as the emblems of modernist politics.

### AT: Owen

#### Owen concludes neg – methodological focus is a prior question and fiat is counter-productive

Owen 2 (David Owen, Reader on Political Theory at the University of Southampton, "Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 2002 31: 653, SAGE)

How, though, does this focus on government act to re-orient the discipline of IR? The salient point for our immediate concerns is that IR theory as a form of practical philosophy can be situated in three roles here, each of which may require different kinds of theoretical practice. The first role is that of seeking to bring a public into being by enabling us to perceive significant effects, to bring them over the threshold of visibility. This may be directed at effects that that are **potential candidates** for government—e.g., as Shacknove points out, persons whose government fails to protect their basic needs and who are accessible to the international community ought to qualify for refugeehood—or at effects that are products of existing forms of government—for example, the fact that, because the current refugee regime lacks any criteria on burden-sharing, the majority of refugees are situated in the world’s poorest and weakest states and that this can have destabilising effect on these states.32 At the same time, this rendering visible may involve contesting the background picture that informs our current perception of consequences—e.g., contesting the assumptions of territoriality it involves—or elucidating previously unnoticed consequences within the terms of that background picture by way of better accounts of the practices in question—for example, the elucidation of the gendered effects of the fact that refugeehood is constructed on an exilic bias. The second role is that of serving an existing public by offering accounts of the consequences of the practices in question that support the shared moral judgement that constitutes this public and offering practicable ways of addressing these consequences—for example, focusing on the human rights aspect of refugeehood and the role that human rights legislation can play in supporting refugees. The third role, finally, is that of seeking to dissolve an existing public by showing that the shared moral judgement that constitutes it as a public is **mistaken** in that the effects with which it is concerned are either **illusory** or not sufficiently significant. In each of these ways, IR can serve the purpose of increasing the intelligence of our reflections on practices of government and it is worth stressing, at least as it seems to me, that some of the hostilities in contemporary IR theory mark a failure to register the different roles that different kinds of IR theory can play in this process. Thus, for example, the point of genealogical investigations is, as **Foucault** notes, primarily that of attempting to constitute a community of judgement, a public in Dewey’s terms, and hence it is primarily concerned with transforming our perception through world-disclosure such that previously invisible consequences become visible.33

### AT: Util

#### And, neoliberalism devalues the meaning of life – individuals become nothing more than cogs in a growth machine, were pleasure becomes subservient to profit and you are protected only insofar as you are cost-effective.

Jerry D. **Rose**, a retired sociology professor from State University of New York, “How Neo-Liberalism Has Created The World's Immigration Crisis,” 2/12/**2008**, http://www.countercurrents.org/rose120208.htm

Well, how about we start with recognizing what may be the crux of the matter: that the U.S. and the rest of the world is caught in a trap of "neo-liberal" globalization which has made corporate profit the be and end-all of public policy. Under the inspiration of this philosophy, the world economy is re-made as a global playground of profit-seeking for its corporate entrepreneurs, with "privatized" societies which **render each individual an atom of existence to be manipulated for corporate profit at the expense of the pleasures and supports of the social commons.** These "atoms," cut loose from the bonds of family and community, are not only free but compelled for their own survival to move from their ancestral homelands to other places where they have a chance of survival. Given that the more "developed" countries offer employment opportunities that are marginally better than those available to people in the "under-developed" ones, the immigration flow is predominantly from under-developed to developed ones, as from Latin Americans to the U.S. and Canada, Africans and Asians to "old" countries of western Europe.

### AT: Alt Fails

#### All their spillover claims link harder to them—it’s more pragmatic to reflect on social dynamics than pretend we can reform politics from the campus, even if there’s no exact blueprint—this is also a DA to the perm

Pepper 10 Prof Geography Oxford, Utopianism and Environmentalism, Environmental Politics, 14:1, 3-22, SAGE

Conclusion

Academic and activist opinion nonetheless frequently argues that Utopian endeavour is necessary for radical environmentalism and for related movements such as feminism, anarchism and socialism. Utopianism is important within these movements to inspire hope and provide 'transgressive' spaces, conceptual and real, in which to experiment within alternative paradigms. To be truly transgressive, rather than lapsing into reactionary fantasy, ecotopias need to emphasise heuristic spaces and processes rather than laying down blueprints, and must be rooted in existing social and economic relations rather than being merely a form of abstraction unrelated to the processes and situations operating in today's 'real' world.

This paper suggests that by these criteria, the transgressiveness of ecotopianism is ambiguous and limited. Deep ecological and bioregional literature, for instance, can seem regressively removed from today's world. Anti-modernism is evident, for instance, in the form of future primitivism and the predilection for small-scale 're-embedded' societies echoing "traditional cultures'. Blueprinting is also suggested by the strong metanarratives driven by (ecological) science. There is a remarkable consensus amongst ideologically diverse ecotopian perspectives about what should be in ecotopia, leaving relatively little as provisional and reflexive. Additionally, idealism in the negative sense is often rife in ecotopianism.

However, idealism pervades reformist as well as radical environmentalism, and the principles behind ecological modernisation - the much-favoured mainstream policy discourse about the environment — are founded on premises that can be described as 'Utopian\* in the pejorative sense used by Marxists. That is, they do not adequately and accurately take into account the socioeconomic dynamics of the capitalist system they are meant to reform. Thus they fail to recognise that social-democratic and 'third way' attempts to realise an environmentally sound, humane, inclusive and egalitarian capitalism are ultimately headed for failure.

Notwithstanding these limitations of ecotopianism, given that the environmental problems featured in dystopian fiction for over a century seem increasingly to be materialising, it may be that we will soon be clutching at ecotopias as beacons affirming Bloch's 'principle of hope\* (1986).

And what of those who, despite these deepening environmental problems, still maintain that 'ecotopia' is Utopian fantasy in the worst sense, while considering their reformist visions to be pragmatic and attainable? These "hard-nosed realists\*, as Terry Eagleton (2000, p.33) ironically calls them, "who behave as though chocolate chip cookies and the IMF will be with us in another 3000 years time", should realise that although the future may or may not be pleasant:

to deny that it will be quite different in the manner of post-histoire philosophising, is to offend against the very realism on which such theorists usually pride themselves. To claim that human affairs might feasibly be much improved is an eminently realistic proposition.

### AT: Gartzke/Bhagwati

#### Neoliberalism is not capitalism – it is the extension of market rationality to all aspects of human life, which actually necessitates constant government intervention that is in opposition to capitalism.

**Brown**, professor of political theory at UC-Berkeley, **2003** (Wendy, “Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory and Event 7.1, Proquest)

In ordinary parlance, neo-liberalism refers to the repudiation of Keynesian welfare state economics and the ascendance of the Chicago School of political economy -- von Hayek, Friedman, et al. In popular usage, neo-liberalism is equated with a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-regulation, elimination of tariffs, and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource depletion and environmental destruction. Neo-liberalism is most often invoked in relation to the Third World, referring either to NAFTA-like schemes that increase the vulnerability of poor nations to the vicissitudes of globalization or to International Monetary Fund and World Bank policies which, through financing packages attached to "restructuring" requirements, yank the chains of every aspect of Third World existence, including political institutions and social formations. For progressives, neo-liberalism is thus a pejorative not only because it conjures economic policies which sustain or deepen local poverty and the subordination of peripheral to core nations, but also because it is compatible with, and sometimes even productive of, authoritarian, despotic, paramilitaristic, and/or corrupt state forms and agents within civil society. # While these referents capture an important effect of neo-liberalism, they also reduce neo-liberalism to a bundle of economic policies with inadvertent political and social consequences: they eschew the political rationality that both organizes these policies and reaches beyond the market. Moreover, these referents do not capture the neo in neo-liberalism, tending instead to treat the contemporary phenomenon as little more than a revival of classical liberal political economy. Finally, they obscure the specifically political register of neo-liberalism in the First World, that is, its powerful erosion of liberal democratic institutions and practices in places like the United States. My concern in this essay is with these neglected dimensions of neo-liberalism. # One of the more incisive accounts of neo-liberal political rationality comes from a surprising quarter: Michel Foucault is not generally heralded as a theorist of liberalism or of political economy. Yet Foucault's 1978 and 1979 College de France lectures, still untranscribed and unpublished, consisted of presentations of his critical analysis of two groups of neo-liberal economists: the Ordo-liberal school in postwar Germany (so named because its members, originally members of the "Freiburg School," published primarily in the journal, Ordo), and the Chicago School arising mid-century in the United States. Thanks to German sociologist Thomas Lemke, we have an excellent summary and interpretation of Foucault's lectures on neo-liberalism; in what follows I will draw extensively from Lemke's work.3 # It may be helpful, before beginning a consideration of neo-liberalism as a political rationality, to mark the conventional difference between political and economic liberalism, a difference especially confusing for Americans where "liberal" tends to signify a progressive political viewpoint and, in particular, support for the welfare state and other New Deal institutions, along with relatively high levels of political and legal intervention in the social sphere.4 In addition, given the contemporary phenomena of both neo-conservativism and neo-liberalism, and the association of both with the political right, ours is a time of often bewildering political nomenclature.5 Briefly, then, in economic thought, liberalism contrasts with mercantilism on one side and Keynsianism or socialism on the other; its classical version refers to a maximization of free trade and competition achieved by minimum interference from political institutions. In the history of political thought, while individual liberty remains a touchstone, liberalism signifies an order in which the state exists to secure the freedom of individuals on a formally egalitarian basis. A liberal political order may harbor either liberal or Keynesian economic policies -- it may lean more in the direction of maximizing liberty (its politically "conservative" tilt) or maximizing equality (its politically "liberal" tilt) but in contemporary political parlance, it is no more or less a liberal democracy because of one leaning or the other. Indeed, the American convention of referring to advocates of the welfare state as political liberals is especially peculiar given that American conservatives generally hew more closely to both the classical economic and political doctrines of liberalism -- it turns the meaning of liberalism in the direction of liberality rather than liberty. # For our purposes what is crucial is that the liberalism in what has come to be called neo-liberalism refers to liberalism's economic variant, recuperating selected pre-Keynsian assumptions about the generation of wealth and its distribution, rather than to liberalism as a political doctrine, set of political institutions, or political practices. The "neo" in neo-liberalism, however, establishes these principles on a **significantly different analytic basis from those set forth by Adam Smith**, as will become clear below. Moreover, neo-liberalism is not simply a set of economic policies; it is not only about facilitating free trade, maximizing corporate profits, and challenging welfarism. Rather, neo-liberalism carries a social analysis which, when deployed as a form of governmentality, reaches from the soul of the citizen-subject to education policy to practices of empire. Neo-liberal rationality, while foregrounding the market, is not only or even primarily focused on the economy; rather it involves extending and disseminating market values to all institutions and social action, even as the market itself remains a distinctive player. This essay explores the political implications of neo-liberal rationality for liberal democracy, the implications of the political rationality corresponding to, legitimating, and legitimated by the neo-liberal turn. # While Lemke, following Foucault, is careful to mark some of the differences between Ordo-liberal thought and its successor and radicalizer, the Chicago School, I shall be treating contemporary neo-liberal political rationality without attending to these differences in some of its source material (See footnote 3). A rich genealogy of neo-liberalism as it is currently practiced would be quite useful, one that mapped and contextualized the contributions of the two schools of political economy, traced the ways that rational choice theory differentially adhered and evolved in the various social sciences and their governmental applications, and the interplay of all these currents with developments in capital over the last half century. But this essay is not such a genealogy. Rather, my aim is to consider our current political predicament in terms of neo-liberal political rationality, the chief characteristics of which are the following: # 1) The political sphere, along with every other dimension of contemporary existence, is submitted to an economic rationality, or put the other way around, not only is the human being configured exhaustively as homo oeconomicus, all dimensions of human life are cast in terms of a market rationality. While this entails submitting every action and policy to considerations of profitability, equally important is the production of all human and institutional action as rational entrepreneurial action, conducted according to a calculus of utility, benefit, or satisfaction against a micro-economic grid of scarcity, supply and demand, and moral value-neutrality. Neo-liberalism does not simply assume that all aspects of social, cultural and political life can be reduced to such a calculus, rather it develops institutional practices and rewards for enacting this vision. That is, through discourse and policy promulgating its criteria, neo-liberalism produces rational actors and imposes market rationale for decision-making in all spheres. Importantly then, neo-liberalism involves a normative rather than ontological claim about the pervasiveness of economic rationality and advocates the institution building, policies, and discourse development appropriate to such a claim. Neo-liberalism is a constructivist project: it does not presume the ontological givenness of a thoroughgoing economic rationality for all domains of society but rather takes as its task the development, dissemination, and institutionalization of such a rationality. This point is further developed in (2) below. # 2) In contrast with the notorious laissez faire and human propensity to "truck and barter" of classical economic liberalism, **neo-liberalism does not conceive** either **the market** itself or rational economic behavior **as purely natural**. Both are constructed -- organized by law and political institutions, and requiring political intervention and orchestration. **Far from flourishing when left alone**, **the economy must be directed**, **buttressed**, **and protected** by law and policy as well as by the dissemination of social norms designed to facilitate competition, free trade, and rational economic action on the part of every member and institution of society. In Lemke's account, "In the Ordo-liberal scheme, the market does not amount to a natural economic reality, with intrinsic laws that the art of government must bear in mind and respect; instead, the market can be constituted and kept alive only by dint of political interventions . . . competition, too, is not a natural fact . . . this fundamental economic mechanism can function only if support is forthcoming to bolster a series of conditions, and adherence to the latter must consistently be guaranteed by legal measures" (193).

#### Neoliberal crises are accelerating—extinction

**Nhanenge 7** [Jytte Masters @ U South Africa, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT]

There is today an increasing critique of economic development, whether it takes place in the North or in the South. Although the world on average generates more and more wealth, the riches do not appear to "trickle down" to the poor and improve their material well-being. Instead, poverty and economic inequality is growing. Despite the existence of development aid for more than half a century, the Third World seems not to be "catching up" with the First World. Instead, militarism, dictatorship and human repression is multiplied. Since the mid 1970, the critique of global economic activities has intensified due to the escalating deterioration of the natural environment. Modernization, industrialisation and its economic activities have been directly linked to increased scarcity of natural resources and generation of pollution, which increases global temperatures and degrades soils, lands, water, forests and air. The latter threat is of great significance, because without a healthy environment human beings and animals will not be able to survive. Most people believed that modernization of the world would improve material well-being for all. However, faced with its negative side effects and the real threat of extinction, one must conclude that somewhere along the way "progress" went astray. Instead of material plenty, economic development generated a violent, unhealthy and unequal world. It is a world where a small minority live in material luxury, while millions of people live in misery. These poor people are marginalized by the global economic system. They are forced to survive from degraded environments; they live without personal or social security; they live in abject poverty, with hunger, malnutrition and sickness; and they have no possibility to speak up for themselves and demand a fair share of the world's resources. The majority of these people are women, children, traditional peoples, tribal peoples, people of colour and materially poor people (called women and Others). They are, together with nature, dominated by the global system of economic development imposed by the North. It is this scenario, which is the subject of the dissertation. The overall aim is consequently to discuss the unjustified domination of women, Others and nature and to show how the domination of women and Others is interconnected with the domination of nature. A good place to start a discussion about domination of women, Others and nature is to disclose how they disproportionately must carry the negative effects from global economic development. The below discussion is therefore meant to give an idea of the "flip-side" of modernisation. It gives a gloomy picture of what "progress" and its focus on economic growth has meant for women, poor people and the natural environment. The various complex and inter-connected, negative impacts have been ordered into four crises. The categorization is inspired by Paul Ekins and his 1992 book "A new world order; grassroots movements for global change". In it, Ekins argues that humanity is faced with four interlocked crises of unprecedented magnitude. These crises have the potential to destroy whole ecosystems and to extinct the human race. The first crisis is the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, together with the high level of military spending. The second crisis is the increasing number of people afflicted with hunger and poverty. The third crisis is the environmental degradation. Pollution, destruction of ecosystems and extinction of species are increasing at such a rate that the biosphere is under threat. The fourth crisis is repression and denial of fundamental human rights by governments, which prevents people from developing their potential. It is highly likely that one may add more crises to these four, or categorize them differently, however, Ekins's division is suitable for the present purpose. (Ekins 1992: 1).